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PRELIMINARY NOTE: CITATION TO/OF "BAM III" DECISION 
The Plaintiff-Appellant herein continues to utilize the 
designation of 2008 decision of the Utah Supreme Court in 
this case as "BAM III". That designation given the fact 
that there were two previously-reported appellate court 
decisions more accurately reflects conventional 
nomenclature in such situations. [The COUNTY'S designation 
of the 2008 appellate decision as "BAM II" is, for those 
reasons, confusing and will not be followed.] 
PLAINTIFFS REPLY ARGUMENT 
In Dolan vs City of Tigard, 512 US 374, 114 SCt 2309, 
129 LEd2d 304 (1994), the United States Supreme Court, 
quoting from an earlier decision, wrote: 
One of the principal purposes of the Takings 
Clause is "to bar Government from forcing some 
people to bear public burdens which/ in all 
fairness, should be borne by the public as a 
whole." 
114 SCt at 2316. Emphasis added. In this case, the Plaintiff 
B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT has been forced through application of 
the COUNTY'S "highway-abutting Ordinance" to singularly 
bear public burdens (e.g. dedication and improvement costs 
of $391,000+ for State Road 171) which should be borne by 
the public as a whole. The discriminatory effect of the 
"highway-abutting Ordinance" is readily apparent on its 
face: developers of parcels adjacent to major roadways are 
required to sustain the full expense of dedication and 
improvement, while similarly-situated (but not "abutting") 
parcels creating the same impact are immune therefrom. 
The COUNTY has filed its BRIEF OF APPELLEE, therein 
reciting and presenting its "costs to the governments" (or 
the "costs to the community") argument successfully 
presented to the trial court. Thus, seemingly, this "appeal" 
might actually appear to be an argument about what the BAM 
III decision really means, moreso than whether or not the 
District Court properly followed the Supreme Court's 
directives. 
To the extent that the adduced evidence (i.e. "that the 
County has no costs", herein admitted within this appeal) 
conforms to the Supreme Court's original intentions, the 
case can be decided on the basis of that evidence, 
notwithstanding Judge Toomey's failure to follow the Supreme 
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"what the cost of dealing with * he impact would be to the 
County". [That cost (to the County) is zero.] The District 
Court allowed the COUNTY to present vague, rambling and 
conjectural evidence through testimony of persons having 
absolutely no connection to the material issues of this case 
except as their "hired gun" status as "expert witnesses" 
as what the "costs to the community" speculatively might be, 
at some abstract time in the future, if and when UDOT ever 
decides to improve the State Road 171 roadway. 
PLAINTIFF'S REBUTTAL TO POINT 1 
CLAIMED FAILURE BY APPELLANT TO MARSHAL TRIAL EVIDENCE 
The claimed "failure to marshal the trial court 
evidence" is a spurious argument: a red herring 
intentionally calculated to divert the Court's attention 
from the true arguments at hand 
The Plaintiff and its counsel are well aware of the 
appellate "rule" and legitimate judicial expectation in 
satisfaction thereof. The COUNTY, however, should not be 
rewarded for having "cluttered up" the re-trial of the case 
through the admission of ail kinds of irrelevant evidence, 
and then claim a "marshaling" requirement to wade through 
all of that irrelevant evidence. Likewise, the Court should 
not in the face of the District Court's obvious failure to 
abide by the Supreme Court "mandate" (to "determine costs to 
the County") expect the non-pievailing party to "marshal 
the evidence" in support of the trial court's verdict based 
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upon the clearly-erroneous legal standard (i.e. "costs to 
the community"). 
Within its APPELLANT'S BRIEF the Appellant did "marshal 
the evidence": the evidence was and continues to be "the 
County has no costs". That fact that "the County has no 
costs" has been affirmatively admitted by the COUNTY'S own 
BRIEF is now confirmed. 
In his case, there is simply no evidence that the 
County had "costs". To the contrary, the simple fact that 
the "County has no costs" has been expressly admitted. For 
example, the COUNTY'S brief states: 
Hence, while the County has (so far) incurred no 
direct cost to improve the road, the County also 
has received no direct "benefit" from the 
exaction. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE, page 21. Emphasis added. 
The County's logic and argument (benefit of zero makes 
its "costs" to be zero) is confusing. It fails to 
appreciate, understand and follow the "rough equivalence" 
test of BAM III and of Dolan. The COUNTY'S "benefit" (to the 
County) argument is fundamentally flawed, as the analysis 
and application thereof misconstrue the actual "inverse 
condemnation" claims of the Plaintiff: namely, that B.A.M. 
was unconstitutionally required (by the COUNTY) to make the 
$391k worth of "excessive" improvements. Whether the COUNTY 
received any "benefit" from the installed improvements is 
absolutely irrelevant to this constitutional "takings" 
5 
question. The COUNTY "forced" B.A.M. to make the dedications 
and improvements; if the Court's determination that those 
improvements and dedication were "excessive", the COUNTY 
should be the entity to repay those expenses. 
The County asserts (p. 21) that 3.A.M.'s costs are the 
same, whether the roadway is owned by the County or the 
State. That statement is not necessarily true. In any event, 
the description confuses the basic1 premise upon which 
Plaintiff's claims have been framed: namely, that the 
County's "highway-abutting Ordinance " required the full-
width dedication and improvement ol the State Road 171 
right-of-way, when "State" requirements actually, there 
were none would not have required any exaction. [Not only 
did the State not have any development-based "impact fees" 
or exactions, but the State gets "fu^ls taxes" and similar 
revenues for such expenditures.] 
That the "County has no co^ts" is additionally 
confirmed by Footnote 35 to its BRIEF OF APPELLEE (page 21) , 
which footnote states: 
. . . Thus, BAM's repeated ins stence that "the 
County has no costs" to wide I 3500 South is 
misleading. While the County may have incurred no 
direct costs to date, if a future "jurisdictional 
transfer" devolved ownei ship of the road to the 
County, then the County v*ould be directly burdened 
by the costs to widen the road wl en such a project 
takes place. In other v.ords, the fact that the 
County has not yet incurred direct costs to widen 
the road doesn't mean it never will. 
Emphasis added. Italicized words "to date" and "yet" in 
G 
original text. 
The COUNTY'S "jurisdictional transfer" (and Mr 
Nepstad's testimony and analysis based thereon) is entirely 
speculative and conjectural. The case has been pending for 
over thirteen years, and the COUNTY has not incurred a 
single penny of expense for the capital improvements to the 
State Road 171 roadway. 
And regardless of the substance thereof, the 
discriminatory effect of the exactions imposed singularly 
against B.A.M. is still unchanged. 
PLAINTIFF'S REBUTTAL TO POINT 2 
SCOPE OF PLAINTIFF'S "INVERSE CONDEMNATION" CASE 
The COUNTY continues for its self-serving reasons 
to mischaracterize the Plaintiff's substantive claims to be 
(erroneously) some kind of "appeal" of a "land-use" 
decision. That characterization has never been accurate, and 
it is not now accurate; any substantive effect arising from 
such mischaracterization is improper. This case, and the 
"constitutional 'just compensation'" claims made therein, is 
not an "appeal" of a land-use decision. This case is an 
"inverse condemnation" claim, for "excessive" governmental 
"takings" effected by the COUNTY pursuant to its "highway-
abutting Ordinance". The scope and magnitude of those 
"takings" cannot be and have not been denied by the 
COUNTY. 
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The scope of the Plaintiff's claim is determined by the 
operational allegations of its filed complaint, not some 
preliminary correspondence filed with the governmental 
entity which refused to consider Plaintiff's claims. [The 
COUNTY Board of Commissioners didn't merely deny the claims. 
The Board refused to hear the claims.] 
Likewise, the Plaintiff's initial submission of the 
proposed subdivision "plat" (showing the roadway 
improvements at the so-called "40-foot line") was done so in 
conformity to County administrative staff instructions and 
directions, in accordance with the Ordinance. Plaintiff's 
submission of that plat was not a waiver of his "inverse 
condemnation" rights (to receive "just compensation") to 
challenge the Ordinance. 
That in the initial trial Judge Timothy Hanson made an 
improper evidentiary ruling is insignificant. Judge Hansen 
had at the COUNTY'S guidance the entire first trial all 
scrambled up, and he (Judge Hansen) was reversed on appeal. 
That the appellate court decision at the COUNTY'S 
inaccurate suggestion in preliminary dicta 
mischaracterized the scope of Plaintiff's claims should 
likewise be insignificant and inconsequential. The Court of 
Appeals, like Judge Hanson, "got things wrong", prompting 
both parties to petition for certiorari. That the Utah 
Supreme Court in granting certiorari, on the three narrow 
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issues it chose to specify, did not identify this narrow 
issue should be inconsequential, particularly for the 
COUNTY. The COUNTY had argued that the case should be 
remanded back to the county's hearing board (as the Court of 
Appeals had directed) . B.A.M. had argued the "appeal" of the 
administrative decision (to enforce the exactions) was not 
a pre-requisite to litigation; on that point the Supreme 
Court sided with the Plaintiff. The Supreme Court ultimately 
directed that the case be remanded for trial, again before 
Judge Timothy Hanson. 
The factually-inaccurate statements (ala Plaintiff 
appeals from the 40-foot line) contained within the 
appellate court's explanation of the historic background of 
the case are dicta,- those statements were not contained 
within the appellate court's opinion as to its legal 
reasoning, nor were those statements material or relevant to 
the court's holding or to the issues pertinent on remand. 
Given the tortured history of this case, the COUNTY should 
not be granted an undeserved (and inaccurate) "windfall" 
from the factual and technical inaccuracies the COUNTY 
itself procured either at trial or upon appeal in cases 
ultimately resolved adversely to the COUNTY'S position. 
From "day One" of this situation the COUNTY, as 
required by its "highway-abutting" Ordinance, has required 
the full "53 foot" dedication and improvements. From the 
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filing of Plaintiff's Complaint (for "inverse 
condemnation"), the entirety of those "excessive" exactions 
has always been at issue. The COUNTY ought now be heard to 
complain about the size of Plaintiff's claims. 
The "constitutional" (i.e. inverse condemnation claims) 
considerations of this case eclipse and override what might 
be applicable in other "administrative appeal" situations. 
See Colman and Hansen decisions, cited in APPELLANT'S BRIEF. 
PLAINTIFF'S REBUTTAL TO POINT 3 
THE COUNTY'S "COSTS TO THE COMMUNITY" ARGUMENT 
The COUNTY begins its discussion [page 19 of its BRIEF 
OF APPELLEE] by citing the very same Paragraph 13 of BAM III 
quoted above. The COUNTY then quotes the now-infamous 
"Footnote #5", which the COUNTY found so objectionable when 
this Court's decision in BAM III was first issued in July 
2008 and for which the COUNTY "petitioned for rehearing" to 
delete that Footnote #5.FOOTNOTE1 While implicitly 
acknowledging that the remainder of the Court's decision in 
BAM III was unchanged and while simultaneously ignoring the 
otherwise precise and absolutely clear text of the unchanged 
provisions of Paragraphs 12 and 13 of BAM III, the COUNTY 
xAt the time summer of 2008 the COUNTY argued for 
deletion of the Footnote because, the COUNTY claimed, the 
offending Footnote made it difficult for the COUNTY to talk 
to and coordinate with other governmental agencies. The 
disingenuousness of that formerly-asserted position is now 
obvious to all. 
10 
manufactures the "cost to the community" argument upon which 
its entire defense has been based. 
Of course the Plaintiff B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT argues 
vigorously the "costs to the County" (and more specifically, 
the COUNTY'S lack of costs) issue: this Court in BAM III 
clearly mandated such to be the focus of the trial on 
remand. The Supreme Court was absolutely clear in its 
mandate to the District Court; that the District Court 
failed to follow the mandate should not be grounds for the 
Supreme Court to do the same. The Supreme Court should 
follow its own "costs to the County" directive. 
PLAINTIFF'S REBUTTAL TO POINT 4 
"DOUBLE TAXATION" IN CONTRAVENTION TO BANBERRY 
The COUNTY argues that this Court's decision in the 
case of Banberry Development Corporation vs South Jordan 
City, 631 P.2d 899 (Utah Supreme Court 1981), and the so-
called "double taxation" argument arising thereunder, is 
inapplicable to the case-at-hand. The COUNTY asserts that 
Banberry involved only development "fees", for which the 
relevant issues were codified (and thus superseded) in the 
Utah Impact Fees Act, 11-36-101 et seq, Utah Code. Plaintiff 
vigorously disagree's with the COUNTY'S self-serving, 
incorrect conclusion (Banberry is inapplicable).FOOTNOTE2 
2The COUNTY'S "Banberry argument" (i.e. that Banberry's 
7-element test for compliance with the "constitutional 
standard of reasonableness" is inapplicable to the in-kind 
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Ultimately, it will be for this Court to determine the 
applicability generalized or specific to the case-at-
hand. The underlying reasons for the COUNTY'S position is 
two-fold: 
1. The COUNTY, not having complied with Banberry 
in the first instance, would like to continue in 
that ostrich-head-in-the-sand know-nothing 
position. 
2. The COUNTY, quite literally "on-the-ropes" for 
the "double-taxation" issues undeniably brought to 
bear in the B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT exactions, would 
like to avoid the application of the 
"constitutional standard of reasonableness" to the 
situation-at-hand. 
The Plaintiff B.A.M. believes and asserts Banberry (and 
its 7-element criteria for compliance with the 
"constitutional standard of reasonableness") is undeniably 
applicable to this situation, for at least the following 
reasons: 
exactions imposed against Plaintiff B.A.M. DEVELOPMENT) is 
strikingly similar to the COUNTY'S long-argued position that 
"Dolan is inapplicable" to the "takings" effected against 
Plaintiff B.A.M. Recall that the COUNTY persisted in making 
the "Dolan is inapplicable" argument even after all three 
judges of the Utah Court of Appeals had ruled otherwise (in 
BAM I) . It was only after the Legislature had adopted 
legislation incorporating Dolan's "rough proportionality" 
standard and the Utah Supreme Court had ruled in BAM II 
(that Dolan was applicable) that the COUNTY abandoned that 
frivolous argument. 
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1. Banberry was decided and written by the Utah 
Supreme Court not merely for the purpose of 
deciding the case (i.e. the "South Jordan City" 
litigation) then before the Court on appeal, but 
rather for illuminating the broader standard which 
would be applicable in similarly-situated cases. 
2. Banberry was concerned not only with "fees", 
but also with "exactions". Indeed, the Utah 
Supreme Court used the both terms, even in the 
same sentence. 
3. It makes no sense whatsoever, in articulating 
and developing the "constitutional standard of 
reasonableness", for the Supreme Court to apply 
the standard to "fees" but not apply the standard 
to in-kind exactions (such as dedications and 
improvements). 
4. Banberry was understood and written for 
guidance in later-developing cases (almost 
prophetically) involving these "constitutional" 
issues. The 7-element test for compliance with the 
"constitutional standard of reasonableness" makes 
no sense whatsoever if "fees" are covered, but in-
kind exactions (e.g. dedications and improvements) 
are not. 
Within this narrow setting ala the intended breadth 
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and depth of Banberry it must be noted that Banberry 
"speaks for itself". Similarly, this Court is the ultimate 
arbiter of what Banberry means and has, since 1981, 
required. Likewise, the nature of this case (and more 
specifically, this "reply" brief) ought not be a "law review 
article" dissecting every word of Banberry. 
Concededly, the predicate fact situation leading up to 
the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Banberry involved only 
"development fees". But that feature should not be read to 
restrict the Court's more expansive discussion of the 
relevant constitutional issues. In the opening paragraphs of 
Banberry, the Utah Supreme Court reviewed the procedural 
history of that specific appeal. The Court noted that both 
parties appealed. The Court then reviewed the then-existing 
Utah case law on the validity of water connection and park 
improvement fees. Immediately following the discussion of 
the four Utah appellate decisions, all of which were within 
the immediately-preceding decade and the last three of which 
were within but two years, the Utah Supreme Court wrote: 
These four decisions have resolved the 
legality of water connection and park improvement 
fees designed to raise funds to enlarge and 
improve sewer and water systems and recreational 
opportunities, as well as the legality of 
conditioning water hookups or plat approval on 
their collection. However, these decisions leave 
open the question of the reasonableness of any 
individual fee charged or land dedication 
required. This question of reasonableness must be 
resolved on the facts in each particular case. We 
therefore reverse both judgments and remand the 
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entire case for trial on the reasonableness of the 
fees the city has impose in this case. 
Because this case is being remanded for trial, 
it is appropriate for this Court to elaborate on 
the constitutional standards of reasonableness 
that should govern the validity of subdivision 
charges such as these. 
631 P.2d at 901-902. Emphasis added. 
It is obvious from the quoted text that the Utah 
Supreme Court was as in many appellate decisions writing 
not merely for direction to the trial court in that case for 
re-trial following remand, but was writing for a broader 
audience and application. The Banberry Court recognized the 
"open" status of the "question of reasonableness", as per 
the four previously-decided opinions. Indeed, the Court 
expanded its description of "reasonableness" to include not 
only an "individual fee charged" but also a "land dedication 
required". Recognizing the broader purpose of its appellate 
decision, the Court noted the more expansive purpose of its 
opinion to future cases: the Court stated that "[t]his 
question of reasonableness must be resolved on the facts in 
each particular case," Emphasis added. Indeed, the Court was 
thinking about more than the "South Jordan City case"; 
otherwise, the phrase "each particular case" would have no 
meaning, relevance, application or necessity. The Court 
concluded its introductory comments by elaborating upon 
"the constitutional standards of reasonableness 
that should govern the validity of subdivision 
charges such as these." 
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Id. at 902. Emphasis added. The Court utilized the phrase 
"subdivision charges" (not merely "fees), thus connoting a 
more broad scope to its announced principles: to include 
"land dedications" previously referred to. The Court also 
used the nomenclature "subdivision charges such as these" 
(emphasis added) , thus implying that the announced principle 
had broader application: perhaps to other kinds of 
situations more than just "fees" or "dedications", but 
perhaps "in-kind improvements" of the type required against 
B.A.M. 
The Banberry decision approached the two fees 
separately. 
In addressing the water connection fee, the Banberry 
court referred to the New Jersey case, in which the Utah 
Supreme Court noted that "the rules governing the allocation 
of improvement costs between city and developer 
would ideally have been such as to insure, to the 
greatest extent practicable, that the cost of 
extending a municipal water facility would fall 
equitably upon those who are similarly situated 
and in a just proportion to benefits conferred, • 
631 P. 2d at 903. Emphasis added. Note that the Utah Supreme 
Court utilized the phrase "allocation of improvement costs" 
in a broad fashion; wording such as "fees paid" was not 
used. In additionally explaining the "fall equitably [and] 
benefits conferred" relationship, the Banberry opinion 
continued: 
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Stated otherwise, to comply with the standard of 
reasonableness, a municipal fee must not require 
newly developed properties to bear more than their 
equitable share of the capital costs in relation 
to the benefits conferred. 
Id. at 903. Emphasis added. The constitutional principle is 
couched in terms of "bear more then their equitable share of 
the capital costs": a more broad principle than merely 
"paying fees". "Capital costs" as a concept connotes the in-
kind improvements which the COUNTY has here required and 
which B.A.M. installed. 
Immediately thereafter in the lead-in to the 7-
element "factors" to be considered the Banberry opinion 
continues: 
To determine the equitable share of the 
capital costs to be borne by newly developed 
properties, a municipality should determine the 
relative burdens previously borne and yet to be 
borne by those properties in comparison with other 
properties as a whole; the fee in question should 
not exceed the appoint sufficient to equalize the 
relative burdens of newly developed and other 
properties. 
Among the most important factors the 
municipality should consider in determining the 
relative burden already borne and yet to be borne 
by newly developed properties and other properties 
are the following, suggested by the well-reasoned 
authorities cited below: 
[citation of the 7 "factors", and cases] 
631 P.2d at 903-904. Emphasis added. 
Applied to the instant situation, "the equitable share 
of the capital costs to be borne by [B.A.M.]" ought to be 
ZERO: the same "capital costs" which are not paid by 
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similarly-situated (in terms of "traffic" impact), but which 
are not "highway-abutting". It is hardly "equitable" to 
force B.A.M., being "highway-abutting", to incur 100% of the 
expenses for the roadway dedication and improvements along 
the 900-foot frontage of his development, when similarly-
situated developments pay nothing. 
PLAINTIFF'S REBUTTAL TO POINT 5 
COUNTY'S CLAIM OF "BALANCING OF COSTS" 
The flaw in the COUNTY'S arguments together with its 
presentation of the "evidence" to the trial court, even 
accepted by the trial court is that those arguments 
disregard the specific direction of the Supreme Court in BAM 
III, as noted above: the COUNTY has no costs. 
The COUNTY'S analysis of the evidence is additionally 
flawed in that the evidence and analysis both ignore the 
unconstitutional, discriminatory effect imposed upon B . A. M. : 
that only "highway-abutting" developers are required to 
incur the costs of the State Road 171 improvements. 
This Court should simply answer the fundamental even 
rhetorical question which the COUNTY'S "expert witness" 
(Mr Nepstad) simply couldn't (or wouldn't) effectively 
answer: 
How are the other developments, not "highway-
abutting", expected to pay for the impact they 
create upon the State Road 171 roadway? How is it 
that only B.A.M. and other "highway abutting" 
developers have to pay? 
For all of his "expert witness" status and stature 
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essentially based upon the "hearsay" evidence the COUNTY 
told him to know Mr Nepstad could not respond to that 
inquiry. 
The "costs to the government" (or "costs to the 
community") argument is novel, but it is not what the 
Supreme Court directed the trial court to consider. 
Presumably, the Supreme Court was well aware of the fact 
as required (now) by the Utah Constitution and as always 
directed by statute that state "fuels taxes" and similar 
taxation resources are to be devoted exclusively to state 
roadways. [Indeed, such was probably the theoretical basis 
for the now famous "Footnote #5" (from the July 2008 initial 
version of BAM III) , deleted by the Court in October 2008.] 
However, the procedural deletion of the "Footnote #5" does 
not and should not now that the "evidence is in" on that 
specific issue, change the Court's fundamental understanding 
or application of the legal principles. If those "fuels 
taxes" and other "taxation" revenues are paying for the 
UDOT-directed roadway improvements anyway, the "costs to the 
government" argument is very misleading and for that reason 
inappropriate. 
The COUNTY'S "cost to the government" approach, coupled 
with the "balancing of interests" analysis, is flawed in two 
major particulars: 
1. The analysis (and the COUNTY'S trial court 
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evidence) ignores the simple fact that State 
"fuels taxes" and other across-the-board revenues 
pay for State roadway improvements, including 
State Road 171. 
2. That B.A.M., as a "highway-abutting" 
developer, has been unconstitutionally singled-out 
for disparate, discriminatory treatment (i.e. 
B.A.M. had to dedicate and improve: $391,000+) 
when other similarly-situated (i.e. same "traffic" 
impact) developers paid nothing, thus offending 
"equal protection of laws" and "uniform operation 
of laws" principles. All of the accounting and 
engineering and smoke-and-mirrors argument cannot 
overcome this simple fact: under the COUNTY'S 
scheme, only "highway-abutting" developers have to 
pay, while everyone else gets "a pass". 
The COUNTY'S "benefit conferred" statements and 
arguments are incorrect and flawed; as such, the COUNTY'S 
arguments evidence a complete lack of understanding of the 
"benefit conferred" principle applicable to this situation. 
The "benefit conferred" analysis does not focus "upon the 
COUNTY" (as the COUNTY argues, for which it received no 
"benefit" to the improvement of State Road 171 because it 
was not the owner thereof). 
The "benefit" analysis falls apart due to the 
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discriminatory effect which has been imposed upon B.A.M.: 
only "highway-abutting" developers are required to make the 
"dedications" and the "improvements" thereto. Similarly-
situated developments, creating the same "impact" but which 
are not "highway-abutting" are immune from any "exaction": 
the COUNTY has no "road impact fee".FOOTNOTE3 
The COUNTY'S seeming argument that the District Court 
(Judge Toomey) correctly divined the Supreme Court intent on 
the "ambiguity" (COUNTY'S terminology) within BAM III is a 
"stretch", at best: Judge Toomey disregarded the clear, 
unambiguous "mandate" directive of BAM III. 
PLAINTIFF'S REBUTTAL OF POINT 6 
TRIAL COURT'S ABUSIVE REFUSAL TO HEAR PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT 
The COUNTY asserts this issue not preserved in the 
record or properly presented in Appellant's brief. That 
assertion is incorrect. 
The in-court dialogue between Plaintiff's counsel and 
the District Court (Judge Toomey) was more than adequately 
3Although an infinite number of hypothetical examples 
could be devised to illustrate the facially-obvious 
discriminatory effect, one example would suffice. For 
example, if B.A.M.'s parcel were, in north-south dimension, 
only four hundred feet (instead of the seven hundred feet it 
is) , the overall "net,f area for "lots" (and houses and 
persons) would be one-half of the former. Correspondingly, 
the "impact" (as defined by "traffic on the roads) would be 
one-half, but the "highway-abutting Ordinance" would still 
require dedication and improvement of the full 53-foot 
width. 
Other hypothetical examples could be derived to achieve 
a "confiscatory" result. 
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identified and described within APPELLANT'S BRIEF. Judge 
Toomey had ample opportunity to rule to allow Mr Smith's 
"expert witness" testimony, but she refused for "abuse of 
discretion" reasons to hear that testimony. 
The Plaintiff's arguments concerning the trial court's 
abuse of discretion in denying Mr Smith's testimony was 
additionally preserved within the Plaintiff's "Memorandum" 
in support of the "motion for new trial". These specific 
arguments to the trial court were presented generally at 
RECORD, at pp. 933-936. 
CONCLUSION 
The COUNTY advocated, and the District Court accepted, 
the incorrect jurisprudential standard to be applied in 
honoring the Supreme Court's mandate in BJ^M III. The "duty 
to marshal the evidence" in light of that incorrectly-
followed standard is meaningless: doing so with only further 
distract us from the appropriate considerations of the case, 
as per the express directives of BAM III. 
The evidence is clear: B.A.M. incurred $391,000+ in 
costs and expenses for the improvement of State Road 171, 
which under the jurisdiction of UDOT the COUNTY has no 
financial responsibility. Other similarly-situated 
developments (but not "highway-abutting") are required to 
pay nothing for their "impact". 
The 7-element test for compliance with "the 
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